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NOTE
THE PROPRIETY OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES UNDER COLORADO'S
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
Now, the laws keep up their credit not for being
just, but because they are laws; 'tis the mystic foundation of their authority; they have no other, and it well
answers their purpose.
Montaigne, Essays of Experience
INTRODUCTION

T has been said that the history of the phases of man's reflections is in great part a history of the confusion of ideas,1
to which, it may be added, the law is hardly an exception. Not
infrequently, the underlying basis of a legal precedent has been
rooted in an an irrational convenient explanation that bore little
relation to an issue when originally faced by a court, but with
each successive celebration, the precedent has grown in stature
more for being a precedent than for being correct. In Colorado,
the issue of whether punitive damages may be recovered in a
wrongful death action is an apposite example of what the English legal historian, Holdsworth, warned is "an object lesson
both in the dangers of hastily acquiring [historical] knowledge
for a special occasion, and in the consequences of the neglect of
[the historical] branch of legal learning. '2 Although it is widely
believed by members of the Colorado bar that the question is
foreclosed and that punitive damages are never recoverable in
an action for wrongful death,3 the purpose of this article is to
examine the verity of this position and to suggest some arguments that have yet to be posited with the Colorado Supreme
Court.
I.

WRONGFUL DEATH: ITS ENGLISH HERITAGE

Recovery for wrongful death boasts a long and somewhat
obscure development. Social mores, historical intrigue, and judicial misconception, as well as changes in rationale without corresponding changes in application, produced a pastiche of confusing traditions and unreasonable rules that became crystalized
in common law precedent. 4 This precedent ultimately found its
1 A. LovEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING (1936).
2 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 336 (3d ed. 1923) [here-

inafter cited as HOLDSWORTH].
3See Hall, Damages for Death- Limited or Unlimited? 34 DICTA 32, 35
(1957).
4 See generally Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law
Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960); Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 239 (1929).
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way into statutory language and judicial constructions. Therefore, in order to understand the Colorado wrongful death statute,
the historical foundations of the common law must be examined.
Early English History
No single factor is responsible for the common law rule
that death is not an injury compensable in a civil court. However, three protean ingredients have been suggested by various
authors as contributing to this early common law conclusion.
Prior to the genesis of the common law tradition under Henry
II, English society was influenced by tribal status, 5 and although
the first form of redress was personal vengeance,6 it was early
established that certain minor wrongs were "emendable" by
payment of a sum of money referred to as bot, or betterment.
Recovery for wrongs depended essentially on a victim's position
within his own tribe and upon that tribe's relative position with
other tribes. Once an offense was "emended," the wrongdoer
avoided the pains of being named an outlaw, and blood feuds
were avoided. Although at first only minor wrongs were emendable, in time the scope of wrongs grew to include homicide.7
A.

"The custom of the people had from the earliest days consecrated inequality. Every free man had his rights, but the rights differed for
different men. The damages that could be claimed for wrongdoing,
like the sort of evidence needed to prove wrongdoing, were graded
according to social status, varying from Kent to Mercia, from Wessex
to the Danelaw. As a writer of Edward's days said: 'People and law
went by ranks;' and the difference between the mal whose death
must be atoned for by twelve hundred shillings, and the 'twy hynd'
men whom it only cost two hundred shillings to slay, was a difference
that ran through the whole structure of Anglo-Saxon society." H. CAM,
ENGLAND BEFORE ELIZABETH 57-8 (1950). See also 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArl-

LAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 26 (1895) [hereinafter cited as
POLLOCK & MAITLAND].
"E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 7 (2d ed. 1922).
In 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 84 the authors illustrate some of the factors

that were considered in evaluating the damages in an early wrongful
death case.
Let us suppose that a man learned in the law is asked to advise
upon a case of homicide. Godwin and Roger met and quarrelled, and Godwin slew Roger. What must be paid; by whom;
to whom? Our jurist is not very careful about those psychical
elements of the case which might interest us, but on the other
hand he requires information about a vast number of particulars which would seem to us trivial. He cannot begin to cast up
his sum until he has before him some such statements as this: Godwin was a free ceorl of the Abbot of Ely; Roger, the son of
a Norman father, was born in England of an English mother
and was a vavassor of Count Alan: the deed was done on the
Monday after Septuagesima, in the county of Cambridge on a
road which ran between the land which Gerard a Norman
knight held of County Eustace and the land of the Bishop of
Lincoln; this road was not one of the king's highways; Godwin
was pursued by the neighbours into the county of Huntingdon
and arrested on the land of the Abbot of Ramsey; Roger, when
the encounter took place, was on his way to the hundred moot;
he has left a widow, a paternal uncle and a maternal aunt. As
a matter of fact the result will probably be that Godwin, unable
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The price of atonement for slaying someone (bot) was referred
to as wergild, a sum based on a man's rank in society.8 Hence,
it can be seen that even in earliest times the loss of life was
looked upon as compensable,9 though the basis for setting the
amount of compensation may seem irrational by modern standards.
As the influence of the English monarchy waxed, so did
that of its courts, which through aggrandizement gradually took
jurisdiction of the aggravated wrongs. At the expense of the
tort law, the criminal sanctions levied by the crown were swift
and complete. Most crimes were punishable by death, and a
felon's property generally escheated to the crown. As a practical
matter, if not in law, the tort often merged into the crime."
This factor of merger eclipsed the concept of emendation and
contributed to the common law conclusion that death was not
a wrong that could be compensated in a civil action. Once the
wrongdoer was executed and his property confiscated, there
was nothing left for a claimant suing for wrongful death. Although the doctrine of merger was later supplanted by a practice of suspension, that is, the tort recovery was merely suspended until the criminal tribunal decided a case, the concept of
merger lingered in the minds of common law judges long after
its statutory demise."
The third factor affecting recovery in wrongful death actions was the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona;
i.e., a personal right of action dies with the person. The origins
of the maxim are unknown, and although it has been said that
the rule had its roots in Roman law, such a conclusion has been
to satisfy the various claims to which his deed has given rise,
will be hanged or mutilated. This however is but a slovenly,
practical solution of the nice problem, and even if he be hanged,
there may be a severe struggle over such poor chattels as he
had.
" Id. at 238-41. Early English law did not clearly distinguish civil
injuries from criminal offenses. Besides the bot paid to a man's wer,
the class of persons permitted to share the damages resulting from a
wrongful death, the King, or in some instances the deceased's lord,
required a payment of wite, a revenue raising penalty. See generally
Admirality Comm'rs v. Owners of S.S. Amerika [1917] A.C. 38, 56-7.
9 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 448-49.
10 See Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607), wherein the court
said:
[I]f a man beats the servant of J.S. so that he dies of that battery, the master shall not have an action against the other for
the battery and loss of the service, because the servant dying
of the extremity of the battery, it is now become an offense to
the Crown, being converted into felony, and that drowns the
particular offense, and private wrong offer'd to the master
before, and his action is thereby lost ....
11 3 HOLDSWORTH 334-35.
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disparaged by the leading commentators. 12 Nevertheless, the
maxim became a shibboleth on which innumerable decisions
have been based.
B. The Rule in Baker v. Bolton
Although not explicitly recognized, these three factors
obviously contributed to the holding in Baker v. Bolton,13 the
source of the common law rule that death is not compensable.
In that early nisi prius case, plaintiff and his wife were passengers on the defendant's stagecoach. As a result of alleged
negligence on the part of the defendant's driver, the stagecoach
was upset and the plaintiff's wife sustained injuries from which
she died shortly thereafter. The husband brought an action
in which he sought to recover the loss of his wife's services
and the costs of caring for her following the accident but prior
to death. The English court rejected the husband's claim for
losses sustained as a result of his wife's death, stating that "in
a civil court the death of a human being cannot be complained
14
of as an injury.'
Obviously, this rule, which resembles the maxim actio
personalis moritur cum persona, was broader than was needed,
and the dictum has stirred a great deal of comment. Generally
it has been contended that the court confused the maxim
actio prsonalis moritur cum persona with the doctrine of merger. 15 Since the plaintiff's wife died she could not maintain an
action, and since wrongdoing merged into felony, no one else
could sue. On closer inspection it is noted that the plaintiff
in Baker v. Bolton was suing on his own behalf for damages
suffered by him as a result of his wife's injuries and death.
Hence the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona was
inapplicable. Both plaintiff and defendant were still alive. Moreover, from the point of view of merger, the result under the
facts of the case is illogical because it is unlikely that the
1Id. at 333-35; see Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton,
32 L.Q. REV. 431, 435 (1916); Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the
Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960); 33 L.Q. REV. 107
(1917); Admiralty Comm'rs v. Owner of S.S. Amerika [1917] A.C. 38,
60; but see W.

BUCKLAND & A MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMIVION LAW

418 (2d ed. 1952) wherein the authors state that:
[T]he Roman law allowed no action for the killing of a freeman,
and it is a probable conjecture that this is due to the impossibility of valuing a freeman. The evidence is essentially negative: it consists in the existence of many texts giving action for
wounding while there is none which gives one for killing.
It seems clear that a man's representatives had no action if he
was killed and that a paterfamiliashad no action if his son was
killed.
13 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
14 Id.
15 3 Holdsworth 334-35,
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driver's master, the defendant, could have been charged as a
felon. An American court added the third dimension to the
conjecture surrounding the rule, speculating that:
[T)he reason of the rule is to be found in that natural and almost
universal repugnance among enlightened nations, to setting a
price upon human life .... Among barbarous and half civilized
nations, it has been common to find a fixed and prescribed standard of value or compensation for human life, which is often
found to be carefully graduated by the relative importance of
the position in the social scale which the deceased may have

occupied.

16

Thus, all three factors previously mentioned probably contributed to the conclusion reached in Baker v. Bolton, however
irrelevant they may have been to the facts at bar. Despite
the weakness of the rationale, however, the rule became firmly entrenched, and no amount of research or argument has
succeeded in budging its effects, other than by the enactment
of statutes.
C. Lord Campbell's Act and the American Response
Whatever the rationale of the rule in Baker v. Bolton, the
enactment of Lord Campbell's Act 17 in 1846 attenuated the
effects of the common law rule and removed to a different
level some of the illogical vagaries that judicial reasoning had
created. The Act, in effect, created a new cause of action permitting recovery for wrongful death. The right of action of
the deceased still died with him,' 8 but his survivors were no
longer barred from maintaining an action in their own behalf
for compensatory damages. The significance of the Act was
widespread, and as a result the common law rule became
crystallized.19 Without a statute, there could be no recovery
for wrongful death. If there remained any question that a
plaintiff could recover damages for wrongful death at common
law, the Act settled that argument. More important, however,
was the Act's recognition that life has value. Although the
ambit of recoverable damages was limited severely by the
judicially-invented pecuniary loss rule and the denial of puni20
tive damages, the initial step had been taken.
16Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 191 (1867).
17 Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. 217, c. 93 (1846).
18 Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852). See generally Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 MICH.
L. REv. 114 (1925).
19 The Recital to the Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. 217, c. 93 (1846)
stated that "[n]o action at law is now maintainable against a person who
by his wrongful act, neglect, or default may have caused the death of
another person." Coampare Admiralty Comm'rs v. Owners of S.S.
Amerika [1917] A.C. 38 with Osborn v. Gillett [1873] L.R. 8 Ex. 88, 93
(Bramwell, B.) and Clark v. General Omnibus Co. [1906] 2 K.B. 648,

658-59 (Lord Alverston).

20 Blake

v. Midlands Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852).
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Although there are some early decisions to the contrary,
for the most part American jurisdictions adopted the principle
of the common law and enacted statutes similar to Lord Campbell's Act. 21 In some instances even the issues regarding wer24
gild,22 merger, 23 and actio personalis moritur cum persona
received de novo consideration; yet the courts reached conclusions consistent with the English precedent. But in doing
so, it is quite evident that wrongful death actions became
colored by the unknowable, and surmised trappings of the
English prejudices. For the most part, the English judicial
constructions were followed without examination to limit statutory recovery to compensatory damages. Thus, while clearly
recognizing that the death of a human being may be the basis
of pecuniary recovery, 25 the modern decisions retain shadows
of golems of the past even when modern statutes clearly and
unambiguously provide for forms of recovery not contemplated
by the English and early American wrongful death acts.
II.

WRONGFUL DEATH iN COLORADo

Just as the early common law influenced the remedial
legislation enacted in England, the early history in Colorado
affected the construction of Colorado's wrongful death statute.
Accordingly, in order to understand the present state of the
law in Colorado, it is not only necessary to appreciate the early
developments in England and the United States, but it is also

See, e.g., Panama R.R. v. Rock,' 266 U.S. 209 (1924) (wrongful death
action depends wholly upon statutory authority). But see 266 U.S. at
216 (dissenting opinion), wherein Justice Holmes states:
[I]t seems to me that courts in dealing with statutes sometimes
have been too slow to recognize that statutes even when in terms
covering only particular cases may imply a policy different
from that of the common law, and therefore may exclude a reference to the common law for the purpose of limiting their
scope. [citation] Without going into the reasons for the notion
that an action (other than an appeal) does not lie for causing
the death of a human being, it is enough to say that they have
disappeared. The policy that forbade such an action, if it was
more profound than the absence of a remedy when a man's
body was hanged and his goods confiscated for the felony, has
been shown not to be the policy of present law by statutes of
the United States and of most if not all of the States....
Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595 (1860); Grosso v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R.,
50 N.J.L. 317, 13 A. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1888); Green v. Hudson River R.R., 28
Barb. 9 (N.Y. 1858).
(dictum).
22 Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867)
21

See White v. Fort, 10 N.C. 251, 265 (1824) (wherein the court states that
the only requirement is that wrongdoing first be heard and disposed of
before a criminal tribunal).
24 See Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1913)
(wherein the court rejects the maxim).
25 Panama R.R. v. Rock, 266 U.S. 209, 216 (1924) (dissenting opinion).
23
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important to understand the origin, history, purposes, and
26
language of Colorado's act.
A. Origin and History
1. Early Territorial Legislation
In 1872, the territorial legislature of Colorado enacted a
wrongful death act which provided for an action brought by a
representative of the deceased where such could have been
brought by the deceased himself.2 7 Unlike the English paradigm, the Colorado act did not limit damages by any "just and
fair" and "necessary injury" formula.2 8 In construing this early
legislation, the Colorado court, in Kansas Pacific Railway v. Miller, stated that:
All else is left to the operations of rules already in existence, for
the admeasurement of damages. When a rule is prescribed in a
statute, all other methods of computation must be ignored. When
none is prescribed, then the statute must be taken to embrace
those ordinarily applied to like cases....
... whatever is susceptible of pecuniary computation enters
into the rule, and what cannot be included must be left out. So,
too, I apprehend, that when the injury is the result of wantonness, violence or gross negligence, it is competent for the jury to
award punitive damages. [citing authority] 29

In light of the differences between Lord Campbell's Act and
the 1872 Colorado act, the language of the court is not startling;
for punitive damages had been recognized at common law.
But remembering the common law development of wrongful
death actions, the decision is remarkable. Based solely on common law principles concerning damages and not upon precedent concerning death, the court concluded that punitive recoveries were permissible when the circumstances surrounding
a death were attended by wantonness, violence, or gross negligence.
See Ellet v. Campbell, 18 Colo. 510, 518-19, 33 P. 521 (1893), aff'd on
other grounds, 167 U.S. 116 (1897) (wherein the Colorado court said
that in interpreting a statute, the meaning and application are to be ascertained "by considering its origin, its history, its purposes and objects,
as well as its subject matter and the language employed").
27
Act of Feb. 8, 1872, [1872] Colo. Terr. Sess. Laws 117-18 (repealed 1877).
The Act provided:
When the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act,
misconduct, negligence, or omission of another, the personal
representatives of the former may maintain an act therefor
against the latter, if the former might have maintained an
action, had he or she lived, against the latter for the same act,
misconduct, negligence, or omission. ...
See generally Comment, Wrongful Death in Colorado, RocKY MT. L.
REV. 393 (1961).
28 Compare Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. 217, c. 93 (1846) with Act of
Feb. 8, 1872, [1872] Colo. Terr. Sess. Laws 117.
29 2 Colo. 442, 464, 467 (1874) (emphasis added).
26
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Two years after the Miller decision, the court declared
that "[a]s a matter of sentiment, life has no pecuniary value." 30
But in the course of the opinion the court said it did not
intend, in setting out the often quoted basic pecuniary loss rule,
to disturb the rulings in the Miller decision. With these decisions then, Colorado law recognized two different bases of
damages. Not only would a claimant be entitled to the pecuniary
losses he had suffered as a result of a death, but he was also
entitled to seek punitive damages when the circumstances warranted.
2. Wrongful Death in the State of Colorado
In 1876 Colorado became a state and the 1872 act, having
enjoyed a relatively short life, was repealed in 1877 by a statute undoubtedly adopted from Missouri. 31 The 1877 statute,
32
which has remained substantially unchanged to this day,
provided inter alia that:
[In every [wrongful death] action the jury may give such damages as they may deem fair and just (not exceeding five thousand
($5,000) dollars) with reference to the necessary injury resulting from such death, to the surviving parties, who may be entitled to sue; and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending any such wrongful act, neglect
or default.

33

The first part of the statute is substantially the same as Lord
Campbell's Act, but the latter portion, i.e., "and having regard
to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances," is not found
in the English model.
Although the question was not raised until 1894, there are
dicta in cases prior to that time that are indicative of the
changes intended by the 1877 act. Immediately following its
enactment, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that the
prior case law was still viable, stating that "the later act
recognizes the justice of the former one by re-affirming the
right of recovery in all like cases in the future, limiting, howKansas Pac. Ry. v. Lundin, 3 Colo. 94, 102 (1876). The pecuniary loss
rule in Lundin subsequently was followed in Pierce v. Connors, 20 Colo.
178, 37 P. 721 (1894) (leading case); accord, Kogul v. Sonheim, 150
Colo. 316, 372 P.2d 731 (1962); Herbertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 110, 371
P.2d 422 (1962); St. Lukes Hospital Ass'n. v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240
P.2d 917 (1952). Compare Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 173 P. 200
(1918) with McEntyre v. Jones, 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953)
(overruling Tadlock in part).
31 Act of March 7, 1877, ch. 25, §§ 877-81, [1877] Colo. Gen. Laws 342.
See Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 P. 352 (1892) (dictum); F. TnFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT 46 (2d ed. 1913); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 384
(1935). Compare ch. 25, §§ 877-81, Colo. Gen. Laws [1877] with ch. 51,
[1855] Mo. REv. STAT.
32 Compare ch. 25, §§ 877-81, [1877] Colo. Gen. Laws 342 with COLO. Rzv.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
33 Act of March 7, 1877, ch. 25, § 879, [1877], Colo. Gen. Laws 343.
30
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ever, the amount of damages to $5,000. ' '3 4 Thus it would be a
pejorative reading of this statute's language to say that the 1877
act overruled the prior decisions.3 5 The language of the later
act expressly continued to provide for compensatory damages
as well as punitive damages arising from the aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act. The only limitation
was that the two categories of recovery, considered together,
were limited to the maximum amount of $5,000.36
When the source of the 1877 legislation is considered, further credence is lent to the conclusion that the 1877 act was to
be construed as consistent with prior Colorado law. As pointed
out, Colorado adopted its statute from Missouri. At that time
Missouri had already construed its statute' to provide for punitive damages.3 7 Moreover, Colorado had recognized the prevailing rule of statutory construction that, where a statute adopted
by the Colorado legislature from another jurisdiction has been
construed by that jurisdiction's highest appellate court, there
is a presumption that the Colorado legislature intended to
adopt that jurisdiction's construction. 8 Applying this rule of
construction to the 1877 act, coupled with the fact that punitive
damages had been recognized under prior Colorado law, the
future course of the statute would seem to have been inalterably set. If the legislature had wanted to change the course of
Colorado law, it seems reasonable that it would have enacted
a statute more readily resembling Lord Campbell's Act. Instead,
the legislature followed a state that had a wrongful death act
providing for both pecuniary losses and punitive damages.
B.

Purposes of Colorado's 1877 Wrongful Death Statute
Since at common law it was held that there was no re-

34 Denver, S.P. & Pac. Ry. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162, 168 (1878).
35
See, e.g., Mitchell v. The Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 12 Colo. App.
277, 55 P. 736 (1898) (the court recognized that the 1877 Act was a substitute, differing only slightly from the former Act, except that the
recovery under the new Act was limited to $5,000).
36 Although this conclusion is consistent with the Missouri decisions [See,
e.g. Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888)], it could
be argued that the $5,000 limit (now $45,000) applies only to the first
part of the formula for awarding damages, i.e., those damages with reference to the necessary injury. See, e.g., Law of May 27, 1911, ch. 113,
§ 2, [1911] Colo. Sess. Laws 294, 295 now CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-5-2
(1963).
3T Owen v. Brockschmidt, 54 Mo. 285 (1873); accord Parsons v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888) (complete statement of Missouri
rule); Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469 (1879) (before instruction proper,
there must be evidence showing aggravating circumstances). See Note,
The Missouri Wrongful Death Statute, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 125, 141 n. 107.
38 Bradbury v. Davis, 5 Colo. 265 (1880); Stebbins v. Anthony, 5 Colo.
348 (1880). See 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5209 (3d ed. 1943). [hereinafter cited as SUTHFRLAND]. But see
Atchison T. & S.F.R.R. v. Farrow, 6 Colo. 498 (1883).
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covery for wrongful death, statutes following the pattern of
Lord Campbell's Act often were characterized as remedial,
and, consequently, were construed liberally. 39 It was generally
concluded that where a statute was remedial in nature, providing a right of action to a class of persons for wrongful
conduct, and imposing upon the wrongdoer a duty to pay damages sustained by a plaintiff, only compensatory damages could
be recovered. Under penal statutes, on the other hand, both the
right of action and extent of damages, deemed to be a form of
40
punishment, were construed strictly.
Admittedly the courts have tended to classify wrongful
death statutes either as penal or remedial, which in turn has
determined the types of damages recoverable. 41 Yet, there is
no basis to conclude that the 1877 Colorado act was not intended
to provide for both kinds of awards. Although the Colorado
court apparently concluded that the Missouri statute was penal,
and therefore was not consistent with the intent of the Colorado legislature to adopt a remedial statute, the evidence is
otherwise. Missouri had recognized two bases of recovery, compensatory as well as punitive. 42 Secondly, the Colorado court
arrived at its determination that the Missouri statute was penal
in nature, not in cases involving damages, but in cases concerning procedural matters. 43 Finally, because the language
suggests two grounds of damages, under accepted rules of construction, the statute should be regarded as a whole, and, being
both penal and remedial, should be given a reasonable inter44
pretation.
31 3 SUTHERLAND § 7205.
40 Id.
Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the
Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438 (1950).
41 See, e.g., Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 P. 352 (1892); Denver, S.P.
& Pac. Ry. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162 (1878) (dictum); Mitchell v.
Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 12 Colo. App. 277, 55 P. 736 (1898)
(dictum). See Note, Punitive Damages in Wrongful Death, 20 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 301 (1971) for a classification of rationales used by the courts to
permit or deny punitive recoveries. See generally Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (note,
however, that the author overlooks canon that penal statutes are to be
construed strictly).
42 Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888); Morgan v.
Durfee, 69 Mo. 469 (1879); Owen v. Brockschmidt, 54 Mo. 285 (1873).
See Note, The Missouri Wrongful Death Statute, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 125.
43 E.g., Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 P. 352 (1892) (statute of limitations); Denver S.P. & Pac. Ry. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162 (1878), (retrospective operation of 1877 Act). Query: Has the Colorado court confused the issues of (1) the right to bring an action and (2) the extent
of recovery permissible under the 1877 Wrongful Death Statute? See
Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Com-

mon Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438 (1950).
44 3 SUTHERLAND § 7205, citing Betz v. Kansas City S. Ry., 314 Mo. 390, 284
S.W. 455 (1926).
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C.

The Language and Syntax of Colorado's 1877 Statute
Turning to the language of the 1877 statute, the punctuation and actual terms employed shed considerable light on its
meaning. Looking at the statute as a whole, it appears to divide
into two parts, thusly:
[In every [wrongful death] action the jury may give such
damages ... with reference to the necessary injury resulting from
such death; . . . and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending any such wrongful act. . . .45

The presence of the semicolon and the use of the words, "and
also," strongly suggest two elements. The first element of the
statute provides for damages in accordance with the pecuniary
loss rule. But the second element allows the jury to consider
the aggravating circumstances of a killing, if such aggravating
46
circumstances appear.
The term, "aggravating," suggests a form of damages not
concerned with compensation. A recent Arizona decision provides direct support for the proposition that the word "aggravating" must be construed to provide for punitive damages.
Prior to 1956, Arizona had a statute resembling Lord Campbell's
Act. Following a decision in that year which limited recovery
under that act to compensatory damages, 47 the Arizona legislature enacted a statute substantially the same as the 1877 Colorado act. 48 Under the new statute the Arizona court followed
the general rule that punitive damages are awarded on the
basis of aggravated, wanton or reckless conduct, and held that
the words, "having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act . . . " refer to awards
of punitive damages.49
III.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER CoLORADo's WRONGFUL DEATH ACT

A.

Moffatt v. Tenney: A Lesson in Judicial Sophistry
Notwithstanding the origins and tenor of the 1877 Wrongful Death Act, in interpreting it the Colorado court avoided
45 Ch. 25, § 879 [1877] Colo. Gen. Laws 343 (emphasis added).

See Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888); Boies v.
Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407 P.2d 917 (1965).
47 Downs v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 80 Ariz. 286, 297 P.2d 339
(1956).
48 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-613 (1956).
49 Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407 P.2d 917 (1965). The Boies court went on
to state that:
[T]he phrase "mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act..." would have to be an element of
damages created by the legislature in addition to those considered to be "fair and just". The word "aggravating" modifies
the words "wrongful act..." and is a clear implication that the
element of damages added by the [19561 amendment are punitive damages. Id. at 202, 407 P.2d at 921.
46
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the accepted rule of construction concerning a statute adopted
from another jurisdiction without comment and imposed a
startling construction that has been followed, apparently without question, to the present. In Moffatt v. Tenney5" the plaintiff sought recovery for the negligent death of her husband.
Although there was no claim for punitive damages, the court
instructed the jury by reading substantially the entire damages
portion of the wrongful death statute, including language which
permitted the jury to consider the mitigating, or aggravating
circumstances attending the alleged death. The jury returned
a verdict of $5,000, the maximum permitted under the statute,
and judgment was entered thereon.
On appeal the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the verdict
was excessive, because the jury had been permitted to award
exemplary damages, having regard to aggravating circumstances attending plaintiff's husband's death, even though there
was no evidence of gross negligence. In affirming th trial court's
decision that the jury's award did not include exemplary damages, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 1877 Wrongful
Death Statute was compensatory in nature, and the language
concerning aggravating circumstances referred not to the ambient circumstances of the death but only to the necessary in-

50 17 Colo. 189, 30 P. 348 (1892).

Although Moffat v. Tenney is the leading

case, it has only been followed in one opinion, decided three weeks after

the Moffatt case. Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 P. 353 (1892). The
following cases, although citing Moffatt, have relied thereon principally
as authority for the pecuniary loss rule: Orman v. Mannix, 17 Colo.
564, 30 P. 1037 (1892) (dictum); Mollie Gibson Consol. Mining & Milling
Co. v. Sharpe, 5 Colo. App. 321, 38 P. 850 (1894); Alcorn v. Erasmus, 484
P.2d 813 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (not selected for official publication).
It is apparent that if the law is
the propriety of punitive damages in
'to the decision in Moffatt v. Tenney.
nbte will be devoted to an examination
its. ramifications in the current state
death.

confusing or incorrect regarding
wrongful death actions, it is due
Therefore the latter part of this
of that decision, its reasoning and
of the law concerning wrongful

For a confusing reference to the Moffatt decision, see Fish v. Liley,
120 Colo. 156, 208 P.2d 930 (1949). There the court was presented with
an action wherein both the plaintiff's husband and the defendant were
killed in an automobile collision. Plaintiff brought her action under the
survival statute and the wrongful death statute. Although the decision
concerns the limitations surrounding the maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona, the court, citing a note in 48 HARV. L. REv. 1008, 1012
(1935), stated that the "'medieval notion that tort actions are punitive
has long been abandoned,' " and therefore concluded that a survival
statute should be liberally construed. But, as the commentator in 48
HARv. L. REv. 1008, points out, the reminiscent of the English law concerning the merger of torts into criminal actions, "since the reasons
for punishment do not exist after a wrongdoer's death, [such claims]
should not survive against his estate." (emphasis added) Id. at 1013.
It would seem that the Moffatt decision was an inapposite authority.
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jury resulting from the death. 51 Following the rule of construction in Kansas Pacific Railway v. Miller,5 2 the court stated that,
unlike its predecessor, the 1877 statute provided a formula by
which damages were to be computed. Furthermore, because "necessary losses" are tied inextricably to pecuniary losses, the
Moffatt court reasoned that punitive
cluded, even though the latter part
compel a conclusion that punitive
when the circumstances warranted.
strue the latter part of the statute:

damages were thereby preof the statute appeared to
damages were awardable
The court went on to con-

Since mitigating circumstances relating to the act itself do not
justify an assessment of damages less than compensatory, it is not
reasonable to suppose that the aggregating [sic] circumstances
contemplated by the statute are such as would justify an assessment of damages more than compensatory. Hence, a different
idea must have been intended by the antithesis. Taken in connection the with preceding language of the section ... the words
"mitigating and [sic] aggravating circumstances attending such
wrongful act," etc., contemplate circumstances,not relating to the
wrongful act itself, but such as affect the actual damage suffered
by the surviving party entitled to sue, either by way of diminishing or enhancing the same."3

The court concluded that the damages awarded the plaintiff
were not punitive - and therefore not excessive.
B. Moffatt v. Tenney: An Analysis
1. The Effect of the Pecuniary Loss Rule
In 1892, it was beyond argument that the first part of the
Colorado statute permitted damages in accordance with the
"necessary injury" inuring to a plaintiff.54 Consequently it was
a truism to conclude that punitive damages were prohibited
under that portion of the statute. Punitive awards, as the court
correctly observed, had nothing whatever to do with the character of the plaintiff's deceased husband, and, as such, a jury
51 A plaintiff's injury, so far as the statute undertakes to provide redress,
rests upon a pecuniary basis. Plaintiff may suffer as much pecuniary
injury where the negligence causing her husband's death is slight as
to where it is gross. Her necessary injury depends, not upon the character of the act causing death, but upon the character, ability, and
industry of her husband in providing for his family .... Id. at 197, 30 P.
at 351.
See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
52 2 Colo. 442 (1874).
53 17 Colo. at 197-98, 30 P. at 351. See also Clune v. Ristine, 94 F. 745 (8th
Cir. 1899) (Colo. dec.) (effect of collateral source rule in wrongful
death action). But cf. Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 474, 30 P. 352, 355
(1892) wherein the court states:
The jury were expressly told to confine the damages to such a
sum, not exceeding $5000, as would compensate plaintiff "in a
pecuniary sense for the loss, if any, suffered;" and that "in
arriving at this sum" they might take into consideration mitigating circumstances connected with the neglect or injury complained of. (emphasis added).
54 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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would not have been obliged to weigh the attending aggravation in arriving at the amount of pecuniary losses. Hence, if
there was no evidence on which to find "aggravating circumstances," the trial court should not have instructed the jury
concerning the latter part of the statute. 55
As even the court admitted, the latter part of the statute
seemed to provide for assessments of a different nature; the jury
was permitted to award damages "having regard to aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending any such wrongful
act, neglect or default." 56 The court, on the other hand, stated
that aggravating or mitigating circumstances may only be
considered by a jury in arriving at the necessary injury, that
is, the terms "contemplate circumstances, not relating to the
wrongful act itself." 57 In support of what appears to be an
egregious misreading, the court suggested that the presence of
the antithetical term, "mitigating," compelled a conclusion different from the obvious. Since a defendant may not mitigate
compensatory damages arising out of a wrongful death, he may
not be held responsible for damages based on the aggravated
nature of the wrongdoing. Therefore, concluded the court, the
statute provides merely for compensatory recoveries.
2. Pecuniary and Punitive Damages Distinguished
Granting the premise that compensatory damages are limited to pecuniary losses, it is difficult to understand why the
court thought punitive damages were inconsistent with compensatory recoveries. Compensatory damages are not dependent
on the degree of the defendant's negligence. Once negligence
is established, a legal conclusion, the extent of compensatory
liability is set by looking to the plaintiff's losses, not the defendant's wrongful conduct, be that slight or great. The point
is this: mitigating or aggravating circumstances have nothing
to do with compensatory recoveries; they concern a second element a jury may consider in awarding damages.
The pecuniary loss rule cannot be said to limit both forms
of damages, because each traces from a different source. Pecuniary losses concern the necessary injury resulting from and
following a death; punitive damages concern the circumstances
surrounding and preceding the death. Pecuniary damages com•5 Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888); Morgan v.
Durfee, 69 Mo. 469 (1879); Owen v. Brockschmidt, 54 Mo. 285 (1873).
See Montgomery v. Colorado Springs & I. Ry., 50 Colo. 210, 114 P. 659
(1911) (evidence must be introduced before a question is in issue);
Whalen v. Centenary Church, 62 Mo. 326 (1876).
56 Ch. 25, § 879, [1877] Colo. Gen. Laws 343.
57 Moffatt v. Tenney, 17 Colo. at 198, 30 P. at 351 (emphasis added).
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pensate the family of the deceased while punitive damages
provide a condign punishment to the defendant, and an example
to others designed to deter similar conduct. 58 Neither recompenses the deceased's representative for grief or solace, because
the pecuniary loss rule limits the scope of injuries that are
compensable, and the defendant's conduct limits the punitive
recovery, if any. Although the deceased's representative may
receive a windfall if a death is found to have resulted, for instance, from gross negligence, on the part of the defendant,
these damages are not in the nature of payments for grief. They
are a form of punishment. As between the two parties, there is
no reason why the defendant should have the benefit of a reverse windfall because of the fortuitous death of his victim.
3. The Nonvictim Plaintiff in a Wrongful Death Action:
A Distinction Without a Difference
Suppose for instance an action in which it is alleged that
the defendant, an owner of a gasoline station, conceals a "spring
gun" in one of his automatic fuel pumps during the night-time
hours because of recurring larceny. The plaintiff at 2:30 a.m.
drives into defendant's station, and when he attempts to remove a hose from a fuel pump he is wounded in his arm by a
bullet fired from the "spring gun." In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges both compensatory and punitive damages. During
the trial, defendant introduces evidence that he had suffered
substantial losses over several months, and the reason he placed
the gun in the fuel pump was to deter thefts. Furthermore, he
states that plaintiff was wounded not while he was lawfully
trying to make a purchase, but, rather, while he was attempting
to steal gasoline. He maintains that in light of these circumstances his action was justifiable. 59 Assuming that liability is
established, it is clear that, under these facts, the plaintiff can
claim two kinds of awards: one dependent on his actual losses,
and one based on the degree of negligence of the defendant.
Significantly, even though conceptually the amount of compensatory damages becomes fixed following a finding of negligence,
the defendant may be able to reduce the sting of punitive
damages by justifying his action with respect to the plaintiff's
58

See C.

MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 275 (1935)
("exemplary damages are assessed for the avowed purpose of visiting
a punishment upon the defendant and not as a measure of any loss or
detriment of the plaintiff"); Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Ass'n, 290 F.
Supp. 369 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D.
Colo, 1967).
59See Starkey v. Dameron, 92 Colo. 420, 21 P.2d 1112 (1933) and concurring opinion by J. Butler, reported at 92 Colo. at 424, 22 P.2d at 640.
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alleged conduct. It is with this aspect of damages that the
enormity of the defendant's act is put in perspective, the mitigating facts tracking the aggravating circumstances as retaliation follows provocation.
Now suppose that instead of the victim receiving a wound
in his arm, he is fatally shot through the chest. In regard to
punitive damages should a defendant benefit from wrongfully
killing a person rather than simply wounding him? Under Lord
Campbell's Act, the answer would be in the affirmative, since
that act provided merely for recovery of pecuniary losses. The
Colorado act, however, provides for more: it permits a jury
to award exemplary damages having regard to the aggravating
circumstances attending a wrongful act. The statute explicitly
bridges the gap between the nonvictim plaintiff and the defendant. Since punitive damages only concern the conduct of
the defendant, the fact that a nonvictim plaintiff will receive
a windfall of punitive damages is of no import. Therefore, it
is an irrelevant distinction whether the victim was wounded
or fatally injured. 60
C.

Moffatt v. Tenney: Its Effects

Once the veil of words around the court's logic is removed,
the weaknesses inherent in the rationale appear stark and unsupportable. Nothwithstanding that the Colorado Wrongful
Death Act appears to be divided into two elements, the Moffatt
court concluded that "aggravating or mitigating" circumstances,
if any, only concern the necessary or pecuniary injury suffered
by the plaintiff. As pointed out, there is no compelling rationale
for such a conclusion, since compensatory and punitive damages
generate for different reasons and from different sources; and
both sources are, in fact, explicitly articulated in Colorado's
statute.
Although the reasoning in Moffat v. Tenney is suspect,
the decision has not been seriously questioned. In common parlance it is generally accepted that punitive damages cannot be
recovered in wrongful death actions. However, it must be admitted that the law remains confusing. In Moffatt there was
GO
In a claim for punitive damages by a victim of assault and battery, the
common law recognized that a defendant may be assessed punitive dam-

ages. Moreover, it is generally conceded that the plaintiff should be the
recipient of such damages. See, e.g., Starkey v. Dameron, 92 Colo. 420,
21 P.2d 1112 (1933). The Colorado Wrongful Death Act not only creates
a new cause of action in certain persons, it also explicitly states that
punitive damages may be claimed by the plaintiff. The fact that the
victim is dead, reminiscent of the misreading of the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona. and of the doctrine of merger is not dispositive because the act, not the common law, defines the scope of damages inuring to a plaintiff.
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no claim for punitive damages; the plaintiff was merely trying
to save a compensatory recovery. As a result, the decision is
limited to the holding that the statute, even though it uses the
term, "aggravating," does not admit of punitive awards. The
case did not hold that punitive damages are never rcoverable
in wrongful death actions. In fact it was said, immediately after
the Moffatt decision, that:
[W]e do not say that punitive damages can never be recovered
in [wrongful death actions]. Section 1512, MILLS' ANN. STATUTES,
a recent enactment [now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-2 (1963)],
may be broad enough to warrant such recovery. But these damages can only be obtained upon proper averment and proof
under this statute.0 1

Even if the Colorado court were to adhere to the construction
adopted in Moffatt v. Tenney, where a proper claim is made
under the exemplary damages statute, and evidence is introduced supporting that claim, a plaintiff should be entitled to an
instruction on this element of damages.
CONCLUSION

As was illustrated in the common law rule laid down in
Baker v. Bolton, recognizing historical misconception and logical
fallacy are not enough. Courts are wisely reluctant to trammel
on precedent, no matter how trenchant the criticism. Rationales
flower and die, but the law remains. When a rationale bears no
relation either to the rule or to the custom of society, inspection
of the precedent should follow. It is submitted that the construction adopted in 1892 in Moffatt v. Tenney, and occasionally
reiterated by the Colorado court, was unsound at its inception
and to this day is incapable of any convincing explanation.
Even the court has expressed doubt about the extent of its
holding. For although the statute was construed not to permit
punitive damages, the court has suggested that such recovery
might have been possible under the exemplary damages statute.
It has been suggested that wrongful death acts should be
remedial in nature, and therefore not permit punitive recoveries. In construing statutes, the "ought" of the commentator
should not be confused with the intent of the legislator. To
suggest that all wrongful death acts have the same restrictions,
notwithstanding clear changes in the language employed, is to
put man above laws, prejudice above reason.
C. Garold Sims

61 Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 468, 30 P. 352, 355 (1892).

